# A Strategic Assessment of Iraq

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*Some might argue that the origin of the civil war in Iraq can be traced back to the attack on the Samara mosque setting sectarian divisions aflame in February 2006. Others might point to Viceroy Paul Bremer's decision to disband the Army, de-ba'athify the Civil Service, and privatize state industries. Together these decisions put over half a million unemployed on the street overnight. Some might argue the looting, combined with weapons caches spread throughout the country, helped create a culture of anarchy over which US-led forces never quite regained control because there were too few troops. Others will point to the inability to seal the borders and thus prohibit support to insurgents. These were critical events in the slide to civil war, no doubt, but this article argues that the military strategy of the United States was compromised before the armed forces left US soil for two reasons. First there were irreconcilable tensions between US grand strategy and its military plans. Second, a fatal flaw in US grand strategy, which conflated al-Qaeda with Saddam Hussein, encouraged Washington into an unnecessary war of choice that had no relationship to the very real and present dangers confronting America. Using Clausewitz as a guide, this article suggests some alternative options for America's long-term security.*

The war in Iraq is littered with fascinating lessons for strategists. Supreme among these is the paradox that the planning and strategic conduct of the war might come to be seen as indirectly encouraging and propelling the very threats to America that the war was designed to eliminate. At least with regard to initial stated war aims, which have shifted during the conduct of the war, the primary purpose of invading Iraq was ultimately to prevent a nuclear attack on the United States. President George W. Bush in a speech on 7 October 2002, just before the vote on the use of force against Iraq, ominously warned Congress and the public that 'facing clear evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud'.[1]

Yet the long-term consequence of the war in Iraq could in fact indirectly eventuate in that outcome. This assessment will be confronting for a great many readers, and so it should. It is not made lightly. Nor is it an easy argument to make,

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nor are the causal links straightforward and clear. But the Iraq war has never been a simple war, from long before it was initiated by the United States (US), to the stalemate in which America finds itself today.

A later war aim was for the US to plant democracy in Iraq and thereby create a political sea change in the region. There is no doubt a radical change is underway, but again, it is the opposite of what the war planners envisaged. Iran, Syria, the Taliban and al-Qaeda have been emboldened, not cowed, by the war. On current trends, the net outcome of this war could eventuate in a litany of problems: the bloody breakup of Iraq; a significant enhancement of Iranian power (and possibly territory) as it rushes towards the nuclear threshold; the provision of oil wealth and safe haven to those allied with al-Qaeda; potentially overwhelming pressure on America's few remaining allies in the region, Jordan, Saudi Arabia the Gulf States, and Israel; and worst of all, the demonstration effect around the world that America is weak and vulnerable.

Understandably there is a clamor for a way out of the situation. Yet Iraq has become a classic security dilemma, where the remaining choices for the US range between the awful and the catastrophic. Of course understanding the existence of a security dilemma and acting on it are two different things. Few national leaders have yet articulated a credible way forward that resembles anything other than staying the course. This is because all of the options available are frankly unpalatable. Nevertheless the problem is not going away and difficult choices have to be made. Young Americans are dying on a daily basis, and as Abraham Lincoln emphasized on a different occasion, it is up to us, the living, to ensure that they have not died in vain. This article argues that in confronting those choices the long-range consequences for the security of the United States – not short-range outcomes in Iraq – should be uppermost in the minds of national leaders. Looking at Iraq from this perspective provides the strategist with some possibly unexpected policy decisions.

## STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

The events of 9/11 presented an unprecedented strategic challenge to the United States and, by extension, the Westphalian construct. For the first time in history a group of individuals took on a superpower and won. The implications of this first battle for New York City and Washington DC in the twenty-first century are far reaching because the two highly effective and interlocking security ideas of the late twentieth century, deterrence and containment, are inapplicable to non-state opponents. 'Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness.' Thus the US 2002 National Security Strategy leaves no doubt that 'We cannot let our enemies strike first.'[2]

The strategy published one year to the month after 9/11, was a first desperate attempt to provide an answer to the conundrum of the failure of deterrence and

containment and to take back the initiative from America's terrorist attackers. The key idea in the strategy was preemption. For the first time since the Concert of Europe in 1815 the 'sovereign prerogative' pendulum had swung back from defense to offense.[3] 'To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.'[4]

Prima facie, preemption is the best solution to the non-state threat yet posed in the post 9/11 debate, but it is nevertheless flawed by comparison to the two ideas that won the Cold War. It is flawed in two crucial ways. First, it has a very limited shelf life if it is used incorrectly or abused. If the intelligence underpinning a preemptive action turns out to be imperfect, and perfection is the standard in the instant-reaction Cable News Network (CNN) world, then the concept will lose its legitimacy. Once that happens, justifying further preemptive actions, which may in fact be more urgent, pressing, and vital than the first controversial use of the principle, might well expose the state concerned to charges of acting recklessly or worse. This matters because it would be coupled with a consequent erosion of moral authority, allied flight, erosion of domestic political support at a time of crisis, and will have an impact on overall strategic success. Such a chain of events could culminate in restraint on a future occasion when vital national interests are at stake, with catastrophic consequences.

Second, and stemming from the first, there is a line between preemption and preventive war. In International Law the former is acceptable in self-defense under strict conditions, however the latter is merely an act of outright aggression. The US Department of Defense defines preemption as 'an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is immanent'. Preventive war is defined as 'a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not immanent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk'.[5] As Jeffrey Record explains,

> preemptive attack is justifiable if it meets Secretary of State Daniel Webster's strict criteria, enunciated in 1837, and still the legal standard, that the threat be 'instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation.' Preemptive war [thus] has legal sanction in exceptional circumstances. Preventive war, on the other hand, has none, because the threat is neither certain nor imminent. This makes preventive war indistinguishable from outright aggression.[6]

International norms and law long ago arrived at the position that if an act of self-defense cannot be justified, it is in fact an act of aggression. The rule of law in the international realm has a domestic corollary, perhaps best articulated by John Adams when he created the Massachusetts Constitution as 'a government of laws and not of men'.[7] Thomas Paine reminds us of the legal basis of American exceptionalism – that which sets the US apart from other countries as the ideal to which the international community strives: 'In America, the law is king. For as in absolute governments the King is law.'[8] Engaging in preventive war demolishes hard won international respect and credibility and sets dangerous precedents for

current and future competitors, opening the door to the destabilization of the international system.

During the 1990s the United States and its interests were under sporadic attack with increasing intensity from al-Qaeda (AQ) and its affiliates. The attacks included: the 1993 World Trade Center attack; the Battle of Mogadishu of the same year; the 1995–96 attacks against US military facilities in Riyadh and Dhahran; the 1998 US East African embassy bombings; and the attack on the destroyer USS *Cole* off Yemen in 2000. During this period the US acted with considerable restraint against its new enemy, choosing on the rare occasion it was in a position to target Osama bin Laden, not to act due to collateral damage considerations.[9]

The AQ *coup de main* against the US homeland in 2001 turned the majority of Western opinion vehemently against bin Laden, and made any military response by the US a retaliation against an act of war. Clearly in that case neither preemption nor prevention was in play. So why put it at the center of the 2002 Strategy? The stated reason is that policy-makers were concerned at the possible linkages between AQ and so-called rogue states that possessed or were striving to possess WMD. The fear was that rogue states would share their WMD with AQ for use against the US. In the absence of clear evidence of a link between AQ and a rogue state, attacking the latter would require the preemptive justification outlined in the strategy. 'We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction [WMD] against the United States and our allies and friends.'[10]

However conflating the terrorists with rogue states is problematic on at least six counts. First, unlike non-state actors, deterrence and containment continue to apply between states, rogue or not. So 9/11 did not change that fact of international affairs. This explains why Iran and North Korea have striven so hard to acquire a nuclear capability – to deter US intervention within their territory. Neither would benefit from the overwhelming retaliatory strike an attack on the US would invite. There is evidence that during the First Gulf War Saddam was deterred from using chemical or biological weapons due to a very clear message sent by the US prior to the conflict that it would retaliate against WMD with WMDs of its own.[11]

Second, no state has ever given terrorists more power than it, itself, possesses. There is no incentive for rogue regimes to hand over their hard won nuclear capabilities, prestige and power to AQ. Regimes like Kim Jong Il's North Korea, Ahmadinejad's Iran, or Saddam's Iraq tend to be paranoid and obsessed with finding and eliminating alternative sources of power to their rule. The President and others have repeatedly said Saddam 'could' hand over WMD to AQ. It is certainly technically possible, but they have never provided more than vague innuendo to suggest what incentives Saddam might gain from doing so – this is because the proposition does not bear scrutiny.

Third, linking AQ to 'apostate' secular states, even rogue states like Saddam's Iraq, is fraught with difficulty. To bin Laden and his followers, anyone who does not believe as they do are *kafir* (infidel), and are expendable. Apostate states, by definition, are the natural enemy of AQ and stand in the way of the achievement of a

regional caliphate. In one of his edicts bin Laden states emphatically 'the hypocrites in Iraq, or Arab rulers who have helped America... are apostates who are outside the community of Islam; it is therefore permitted to take their money and their blood'.[12] Bin Laden had at various times criticized Saddam, labeling him a 'former [US] collaborator'.[13] Witness the pressure AQ has put on Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. One of Osama bin Laden's early key drivers was to expel the infidel forces (US) from the Muslim Holy Places in Arabia when his offer of Afghan-trained mujahedin to attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait was rejected by the Saudi monarchy in 1991.

Fourth, the problems associated with rogue states and terrorist groups can be quite distinct. The policy options for dealing with them might overlap in some areas but the state/stateless division is the ultimate differentiator with regard to generating strategy. Some options, such as diplomacy and sanctions, like deterrence, simply do not apply to stateless actors. There is no question that state sponsorship of terrorism requires a policy response, up to and including the use of force. However, actions on the outer envelope of Chapter VII rules, such as preemption, require a high standard of proof. If this standard is not met or is perceived the same, complications will arise in the implementation of strategy ranging from troubled alliance relations, to the multiplication of, and increased cooperation among, opponents. The worst outcome would be to divert finite attention and resources to second or third order threats at the expense of the nation's top strategic priority. Clausewitz writes at length about the problem of multiple enemies, 'we must be certain our political position is so secure that ... success will not bring further enemies against us who could force us immediately to abandon our efforts against out first opponent'.[14]

Fifth, expanding the object of national policy to a broad class of activity unnecessarily dilutes strategic focus and allows a range of issues to crowd onto the security agenda that are not related to 9/11 and its consequences, the war in Iraq being the prime example. 'No one [designs a strategy or] – starts a war or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so', cautions Clausewitz, 'without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it ... This is the governing principle which will set its course, prescribe the scale of means and effort which is required, and make its influence felt throughout down to the smallest operational detail.'[15] Having been attacked by AQ, the National Security Strategy should have concentrated specifically on AQ instead of terrorism in general.

Finally, the real world application of this new strategy against Saddam Hussein's Iraq, fell short of the intent of the 2002 document. In October 2002 the President outlined a highly compelling case against Iraq:

> If the Iraqi regime is able to produce, buy, or steal an amount of highly enriched uranium a little larger than a single softball, it could have a nuclear weapon in less than a year. [Saddam] would be in a position to threaten America. And Saddam Hussein would be in a position to pass nuclear technology to terrorists.[16]

In the State of the Union just 12 weeks later the President closed the circle on his reasoning:

> The International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in the 1990s that Saddam Hussein had an advanced nuclear weapons development program, had a design for a nuclear weapon and was working on five different methods of enriching uranium for a bomb. *The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa*. Our intelligence sources tell us that he has attempted to purchase high-strength aluminum tubes suitable for nuclear weapons production.
>
> Year after year, Saddam Hussein has gone to elaborate lengths, spent enormous sums, taken great risks to build and keep weapons of mass destruction. But why? The only possible explanation, the only possible use he could have for those weapons, is to dominate, intimidate, or attack.[17]

There is of course one other, unstated, reason – to deter. It is unclear how Saddam could threaten the United States if he had a nuclear weapon. Deterrence would continue to apply to both parties. It is true that Saddam 'could provide one of his hidden weapons (*sic*) to terrorists', had he possessed any, but no explanation is made as to what Saddam would gain by doing so.[18] The argument as stated did not offer 'incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is immanent' as required by Pentagon policy nor did it fit Webster's criteria of a threat so 'instant, [and] overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation'. In the end the uranium claims proved to be false.

The United States had been attacked by a stateless, global, terrorist organization that defeated the long standing and successful strategies of containment and deterrence. So 9/11 was an act of war that demanded a retaliatory response. The preponderance of world opinion was with the United States on that day. Even the strategically agnostic French understood and supported the US in theory (if not in practice) when *Le Monde* famously editorialized it support with the Kennedyesque 'We are all Americans.' Not one country questioned the US-led mission into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan where AQ was well known to be based. Iraq however, would be another matter.

## STRATEGY OF THE OTHER SIDE

Clausewitz reminds strategists to be clear about objectives. So what are bin Laden's objectives? After all it was he, and not the deterable Saddam, who attacked the United States. A close reading of his various diatribes boil down to a profound anti-Semitism, a desire to eject the 'Jewish Crusader' alliance out of Saudi Arabia, which in later pronouncements is expanded to the whole 'Muslim world'. There is a difference in Islamic theory between defensive war, that is valorous, and offensive war, that is banned. Bin Laden repeatedly claims that he is fighting defensive jihad 'our actions are but a reaction to yours' is a common refrain.[19] He quotes the *Qur'an* to support his key motive 'and if you punish (your enemy. . .), then punish them with

the like of that with which you were afflicted'.[20] As evidence he states 'for we only killed Russians after they invaded Afghanistan and Chechnya, ... Americans in New York after they supported the Jews in Palestine and invaded the Arabian peninsula...Europeans after they invaded Afghanistan and Iraq... Reciprocal treatment is part of justice, and he who commences hostilities is the unjust one... Therefore, stop spilling our blood in order the save your own.'[21]

For a 'weak' power to prevail in a fight against a materially stronger opponent, according to Clausewitz, 'you must match your effort against [the opponent's] power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will'.[22] When outright military victory is not obtainable but the weaker side has the stronger will (driven by fanaticism for example) 'the... question is how to influence the enemy's expenditure of effort; in other words how to make the war more costly for him... wearing down the enemy ...means using the duration of the war to bring about a gradual exhaustion of his physical and moral resistance'.[23]

In the Afghan case, while combat success against the Soviets was important, the key to exhaustion of the Soviet physical and moral resistance hinged on how much Moscow was willing to spend in blood and treasure relative to the intrinsic value of Afghanistan. In hindsight, the Afghan adventure contributed significantly to hastening the demise of the *Union* of the Soviet Socialist Republics that George Kennan had assessed from the outset as internally weak and prone to eventual collapse.[24] That assessment might also have been made of AQ prior to the invasion and occupation of Iraq.

The lesson of the success of the mujahedin against the Soviets was not lost on bin Laden who said in 1997: 'I have benefited so greatly from the jihad in Afghanistan that it would be impossible for me to gain such a benefit from any other opportunity.'[25] In the same interview he shows early signs of realizing the political impact of America's aversion to casualties. Noting the American withdrawal from Somalia in 1995, bin Laden mocks the US for leaving:

> after claiming that they were the largest power on earth. They left after some resistance from the powerless, poor and unarmed people whose only weapon is the belief in God... We learned from those who fought there, that they were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the Russian fighters... *If the US still thinks and brags that it still has this kind of power, even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden, and Somalia, then let its troops go back to those who are awaiting its return*.[26]

Like Hitler's growing appetites in the 1930s, bin Laden's escalating attacks against the US during the 1990s led him to conclude by 2000 that he was ready to take the fight directly to the heart of the far enemy.

> Using very meager resources and military means, the Afghan mujahedin demolished one of the most important human myths in history and the biggest

> military apparatus. We no longer fear the so-called Great Powers. We believe that America is much weaker than Russia.[27]

Osama bin Laden's strategy against the 'far enemy' of the United States is a modified form of the mujahedin strategy against the Soviets, which the US supported at the time. 'We gained expertise in guerrilla and attritional warfare in our struggle against... Russia, in which we... ground it down for ten years until it went bankrupt' bin Laden claimed.[28] In 2004 as the resistance in Iraq continued to escalate bin Laden enthused 'we are continuing to make American bleed to the point of bankruptcy'.[29] To support his claim he cites a Royal Institute for International Affairs study 'al-Qaeda spent $500,000 on the September 11 attacks, while America lost more than $500 billion... in the event and its aftermath. That makes a million American dollars for every AQ dollar.'[30]

It is impossible to conclusively prove whether 9/11 was bin Laden wildly lashing out or whether it was intended to be a strategic masterstroke. It is a standard tactic in unconventional war for the weaker side to perpetrate a spectacular attack in order to provoke the stronger side into a disproportionate response at a time and place less suited to the latter's way of war. AQ preparation of the Afghan battlespace for the inevitable American response to 9/11, including but not limited to assassinating Ahmad Shah Massoud; not telling the Taliban about 9/11 which would inevitably lead to the destruction of the regime; dispersing mujahedin around the world; and personal messages to his family; suggest bin Laden's strategic intent.

If his strategic intent was to provoke the United States into fulfilling his prophesy that the US is the 'new Rome'; that it is a dedicated enemy of Islam; that its intent since 1991 onwards has been to invade and occupy Muslim land; that it is a hegemon hell bent on appropriating oil for its own decadent consumerist ends; and that it is on a Crusade to slaughter Muslims into submission and thereby protect Israel; in the eyes of those sympathetic to him, he did a pretty good job.[31] The fact that none of these conspiracy theories bears any resemblance to geostrategic reality – or that bin Laden's act of aggression invited a response that, according to his own 'eye for an eye' theory, is justified – is irrelevant. In counterinsurgency, the perception of one's own side is paramount. Thus stirred to action, their will to repel the invader should know no bounds.

Osama knew that the US would attack Afghanistan but the war with Iraq would have exceeded his wildest expectations. From the outset it had the potential to assist his cause in at least six ways.

First, he despised Saddam as an apostate secular ruler and former 'agent' of the US (Iran–Iraq War) and as such his removal was in line with AQ policy for the region and would provide an opening for AQ to exploit if the right conditions prevailed. Second, attacking Iraq was straight out of the bin Laden propaganda textbook – it would 'prove' its various Crusader conspiracy theories. Third, he knew the appearance of injustice of the US *casus belli* would flagrantly inflame anti-American opinion on the 'Arab street'. The fact that it turned most of Western Europe against the US was an added bonus. Indeed the widespread global support

for the United States at its peak on 90/11 was reversed just two short years later. This was an unprecedented strategic setback for the US and its cause. Fourth, the inevitable occupation, resistance to which has a special place in Muslim lore, provided a fertile global recruiting ground and source of sympathy to bin Laden's cause. Fifth, the occupation fixed and located his enemy in an unfamiliar place where they did not know the land, people or language and were thus potentially vulnerable if they were required to be on the ground for an extended period of time. Finally, if Saddam was removed but the remainder of the US project failed, Iraq with its vast oil reserves and sheer size, would provide a superb replacement for the loss of Afghanistan.

## STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

> *The first, the supreme, the most far reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.*[32] Carl von Clausewitz

Having been attacked by a terrorist group based in Afghanistan, funded by Saudi money, led and predominantly manned by Saudi nationals, the US decision to attack *Iraq* was perplexing to some. Even President Bush's top counterterrorism official did not understand what was going on in the White House. 'Having been attacked by al-Qaeda, for us now to go bombing Iraq in response would be like our invading Mexico after the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor', Richard Clarke lamented to Colin Powell.[33]

On 12 September 2001 when the principals met to discuss strategy Saddam Hussein was immediately on the agenda.[34] He was never removed. Initial and subsequent assessments judged, rightly, that such an audacious, innovative, and devastating strategic strike at the heart of the US economic and political universe could only be the work of one organization, AQ. Yet Saddam remained on the agenda. There are multiple reasons for this. During the 1990s political and public perceptions grew that the First Gulf War was terminated too soon, that the spectacular military victory was not effectively translated into a fitting political settlement, and that it was a mistake to allow Saddam to remain in power. Key members of the second Bush administration including the Vice President, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State, and a host of lower ranking officials, had all served in the first Bush administration and all had a change of heart over the decision not to remove Saddam.[35]

The first hint of this change came in a defense policy guidance document written in 1992, the year after Iraq was ejected from Kuwait. Authored by Zalmay Khalilzad, then a senior Pentagon official for policy planning and overseen by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis 'Scooter' Libby, the document 'endorsed a policy of

[unilateral] preventive disarmament of rogue states seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction'.[36] At its heart it sought to extend US primacy through superior military power 'so overwhelming that no country would dream of ever becoming a rival'.[37] Such stark unilateralism ran directly contrary to US policy at the time and the paper was withdrawn and rewritten. But the ideas lived on. Secretary Cheney said of the controversial draft to Khalilzad 'you've discovered a new rationale for our role in the world'.[38]

Wolfowitz's views continued to shift during the 1990s. While uncomfortable with leaving Saddam in power, when prodded, he would cite the standard reasons why it was prudent for the US to do so. The elder George Bush, presciently put the case to troops in February 1999. Frustrated at accusations he had not finished the Iraqi dictator the former president said:

> had we gone into Baghdad – we could have done it... And then what?... whose life would have been at stake in perhaps... an urban guerrilla war... whose life would be on my hands... because I, unilaterally, went beyond international law, went beyond the stated mission, and said we are going to show our macho?... We're going to be an occupying power – America in an Arab land – with no allies at our side? It would have been disastrous.[39]

Wolfowitz's support of this argument tapered off towards the end of the decade. In 1997 he wrote a book chapter arguing that containment, and in particular the sanctions regime, was not working. While there were no other good solutions to the problem, the chapter did not quite advocate regime change.[40]

By the end of that year his mind was made up. Teaming with Khalilzad, they argued to 'Overthrow Him' in the *Weekly Standard* – in other words regime change was now the only answer.[41] Four weeks later, in January 1998, the Project for a New American Century published an open letter to President Bill Clinton demanding regime change in Baghdad. Khalilzad, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Richard Armitage, John Bolton and a host of others who would take posts in the future Bush White House were signatories to the letter. By October President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act in an effort to dampen the criticism that he was soft on Iraq.

'The Clinton Administration left office believing that Saddam was a manageable nuisance.' When they met for a photo-op a month before President-elect Bush was inaugurated 'Clinton told Bush that he had read his campaign statements carefully and his impression was that his top two priorities were missile defense and Iraq. Bush said this was correct. Clinton proposed a different set of [six] priorities' starting with AQ and ending with Iraq. 'Bush did not respond'.[42] Vice President-elect Cheney similarly contacted Secretary of Defense William Cohen to set up the President-elect's first defense briefing. 'Cheney made it clear that he did not want an eighty days around the world kind of approach. The session should focus principally on Iraq.'[43]

Director for Persian Gulf Affairs in the National Security Council (1999–2001) and former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Iraq expert, Dr Kenneth Pollack wrote in his book *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* that the

George W. Bush hawks 'had an almost obsessive fixation on getting rid of Saddam's regime... From day one they urged an aggressive regime change strategy... Their dogma was that the Iraqi regime was the root cause of nearly every evil to befall the United States.'[44] Hyperbole aside, the thrust of Pollack's observation is borne out by a range of sources that examine the meetings and discussions immediately following 9/11.

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had urged Iraq as a key target for a US response to 9/11 on 12 September. On the 15th, his deputy, Paul Wolfowitz 'estimated that there was a 10 to 50 percent chance Saddam was involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks' [what he based that assertion on is not noted] and stressed that war with Saddam should be a top priority. At that time President Bush 'had strong reservations about attacking Iraq' due to his prudent concern that undertaking war on two or more fronts would generate a 'huge risk' that the US might consequently suffer a 'lack of focus'.[45] Afterwards the President asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff if he was:

> making a mistake by focusing on al-Qaeda instead of Saddam. [General Henry H.] Shelton reassured the president that he had made the correct call. Attacking Iraq would be out of the blue and apparently without clear provocation... nor...was there any reason to think that Iraq was linked to the September 11 attacks. 'That's what I think', Bush told Shelton.[46]

But the President, rightly eager to ensure he covered all his bases, was concerned that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz knew more on the topic than met the eye. When President Bush found Richard Clarke, his top counterterrorism official, in the situation room on the evening of the 12th the following exchange took place, which bears quoting in full:

> He grabbed a few of us and closed the door to the conference room. 'Look', he told us, 'I know you have a lot to do and all... but I want you, as soon as you can, to go back over everything, everything. See if Saddam did this. See if he is linked in any way...'
> I was once again taken aback, incredulous, and it showed. 'But Mr. President, al-Qaeda did this.'
> 'I know, I know, but... see if Saddam was involved. Just look. I want to know any shred.'
> 'Absolutely, we will look... again. But, you know, we have looked several times for state sponsorship of al-Qaeda and not found any real linkages to Iraq.'
> 'Look into Iraq, Saddam', the president said testily and left.
> 'Wolfowitz got to him' Lisa [Gordon-Hagerty] said.

Immediately Clarke directed a government-wide review on the issue. 'All agencies and departments agreed, there was no cooperation between [Iraq and AQ]. A memorandum to that effect was sent up to the president' [presumably the 21 September 2001 Presidential Daily Brief].[47]

Clarke was starting to believe what his contacts at the Pentagon had been telling him for some time, namely that key players in the administration fully intended to instigate regime change in Iraq before 9/11 gave them a convenient excuse. Richard Clarke recalls his experience on first returning to the White House after the attacks.

> I expected to go back to a round of meetings examining what the next attacks could be, what our vulnerabilities were, what we could do about them in the short term. Instead, I walked into a series of discussions about Iraq. At first I was incredulous that we were talking about something other than getting al-Qaeda. Then I realized... that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try and take advantage of this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the beginning of the administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing for war with Iraq. *[Prior to 9/11] my friends in the Pentagon had been telling me that the word was we would be invading Iraq sometime in 2002*.[48]

Such a plan, if it did exist, would have been consistent with the evolution of Wolfowitz's ideas over the preceding decade, in line with the spirit (if not the wording) of the law of the land (Iraq Liberation Act), and an idea the vast majority of the new administration had literally signed up to in the PNAC letter to President Clinton.

President Bush overturned his initial caution about conducting a two front war and accepted the Rumsfeld–Wolfowitz argument that there was a link, or at the very least, the potential for a link between Saddam and AQ, and that was enough upon which to base the key strategic decision of his presidency.[49] By the time of the publication of the 2002 Strategy, President Bush was convinced 'you can't distinguish between al-Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror... I can't distinguish between the two, because they're both equally as bad, and equally as evil, and equally as destructive.'[50]

Vice President Cheney went even further and stated categorically that Saddam 'had an established relationship with al-Qaeda'.[51] However, the subsequent difficulty in finding proof of links between Saddam's Iraq and AQ, proved a not inconsiderable challenge.

In addition to the presidential statements above, there was a litany of official announcements, from the 'Axis of Evil' State of the Union speech on down, that *inferred* dire consequences from an *implied* connection Saddam and AQ. 'The... Iraqi regime ...*could* have a nuclear weapon in less than a year... Hussein *would be in a position* to pass nuclear technology to terrorists'.[52] Yet possession does not imply intent, much less *potential* possession. It seems no one was asking the tough questions about the assumptions and objectives of the emerging US strategy.

These vague but portentous statements culminated in Secretary of State Powell's presentation of the administration's case for war to the United Nations (UN) Security Council on 5 February 2003.[53] On the central question of the AQ–Saddam link, as well as a number of key WMD related claims, Powell's case was pretty thin.

The AQ–Saddam link claim hinged predominantly on one individual Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Yet it was not until 17 October 2004 that al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to bin Laden, thereby shattering Powell's case and proving, yet again, the dangers inherent in the fallacy of assuming the enemy is a monolith. Little wonder articles from 2003 onwards continued to ask 'who is the enemy'?

But there were other problems. Analysts pointed out that the US State Department's annual survey of global terrorism, in 2000 stated that: 'the [Iraqi] regime has not attempted an anti-Western terrorist attack since its failed plot to assassinate former President Bush in 1993 in Kuwait'.[54] Powell's deputy, Richard Armitage, gave an interview the following year (2001) and admitted that 'a lot of folks out of the administration have spent a lot of time and energy trying to tie Saddam and AQ together, but thus far it hasn't been able to be done'.[55] The knockout blow came in 2004 when Powell himself was forced to conceded that 'there is [no]. . .concrete evidence about the connection... I have not seen smoking-gun.'[56]

Indeed, the missing link was never proven. On the contrary, it was initially downplayed and later outright discredited by a range of credible sources: the 21 September 2001 Presidential Daily Brief; the 2002 NIE; the 9/11 Commission Report; the Senate Report on Pre-War Intelligence on Iraq; as well as a series of reports from CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Two and a half years after Secretary Powell's admission, the President made the following defense of the alleged link between Saddam and AQ in a press conference in 2006:

> THE PRESIDENT: What did Iraq have to do with what?
> Q: The attack on the World Trade Center?
> THE PRESIDENT: Nothing. . . nobody has ever suggested in this administration that Saddam Hussein ordered the attack. . .Nobody has ever suggested that the attacks of September the 11th were ordered by Iraq.[57]

The legalistic specificity of this defense stands in marked contrast to the frequently inferred and implied presentations of the preceding years. This matters because in October 2002 the American people were in favor of the coming war because an overwhelming majority of the public (79 percent) thought Saddam Hussein was close to obtaining nuclear weapons or already had them. And two-thirds (66 percent) believed that he helped the terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11.[58] The proportion of people believing that Saddam was linked to 9/11 rose to 69 percent in 2003.[59]

War is a contest of wills. In recent years the United States has come under a lot of criticism for having a deep seated aversion to casualties and by his own admission, this was a motivator for Osama bin Laden to attack the homeland. However, any aversion to taking casualties is a function of the importance of a conflict in relation to national survival. By definition, wars of choice sit at the other end of the threat spectrum and therefore the general public will always be less inclined to engage in them. Likewise, national will is likely to weaken considerably if the foundations for a war of choice prove to be groundless.

This is not to suggest or imply that the Commander in Chief lied to the public. As he explained, what drove his strategy was the unanalyzed *possibility* that Saddam might hand over WMD to AQ. This was enough to justify the war against Iraq in his judgment. But as the basis for conflating rogue states and terrorists began to wear thin in the face of events on the ground in Iraq, initial public acceptance of the strategy turned to increasing criticism. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many people attribute this to the role of the media. It is probably more accurate to observe that the inherent tensions in the administration's strategy were inevitably going to become more evident as time went on and more data became available: 'When an objective was beyond one's strength in the first place, it will always remain so.'[60]

## MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

There is a fascinating tension between US grand strategy and US military strategy regarding Iraq. Where grand strategy was based on worst-case assumptions, US military strategy was based on best-case assumptions. Neither assumption-set turned out to have much basis in fact. Grand strategy was premised on rogue states agreeing to distribute their most powerful and highly prized weapons (WMDs) to terrorists confident they would use them to attack only the US homeland and that such an attack would be retaliation-free for the weapon-donating state. Military strategy assumed that its forces invading Iraq would be met as liberators, that it could install a democracy that would be economically robust and self-sufficient (not a traditional military task); and that all this could be done in a short time frame 'six days, six weeks, but not longer than six months' in an 'economy of force' deployment lacking UN sanction or anything like the grand coalition assembled in 1991.[61] US military strategy further assumed that all of this rapid political and societal change would be calmly accepted by the different winners and losers inside Iraq, and by the country's neighbors, all in the interests of sectarian harmony and international goodwill. Finally, it was assumed that because the war would be short that it would be possible to keep costs in check and that the Iraqi oil economy would provide the funds for its own reconstruction, that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and coalition partners would take on the reconstruction burden and that therefore was not a top US planning priority.

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the disconnect between grand and military strategy regarded the priority each placed on Saddam's WMD. By any measure it was not the military's highest priority after entering Iraq, far from it. In terms of the quality and quantity of pre-war intelligence, funding, troop allocations, or the priority of the mission in the operational plan, it was at best a third tier priority.[62] This is remarkable because the only scenario the 2002 NIE could envisage Saddam actually using WMD was if he was cornered and faced regime collapse following an invasion.[63] With nothing left to lose the NIE judged he might try to take everyone with him.

The head of military intelligence before the war Major General James 'Spider' Marks was given an unprioritized list of 946 supposed WMD sites, the intelligence

for which was dated and thin – far too thin to be the key premise for the war. At the same time the Vice President was insisting that '*there is no doubt* Saddam Hussein now has WMD. *There is no doubt* that he is amassing them *to use* against our friends, against our allies and *against us*.'[64] The different between Cheney's statements and the evidence he had before him perplexed Marks. After conducting the most thorough review he could he was obliged to report to his superior, the land forces commander, General David D. McKiernan 'Sir, I can't confirm what's inside any of these sites.'[65]

According to Woodward's interview of General Marks, the fact that there were any troops allocated to finding, testing and securing the 946 sites was only due to Marks' initiative. 'There had never actually been a military unit assigned to the task. Given that WMD were the most often cited reasons for the war' the eventual allocation of a mere battalion (several hundred people) 'seemed odd to Marks, even negligent'.[66] Marks eventually managed to find a larger unit for the task but the unit assigned was an artillery brigade and had no experience with WMD. Moreover, Marks had to fight the Pentagon to get the brigade. The unit was notified of their role so late that 'it would have only about a month to get ready, rehearse, deploy, and integrate intelligence and technical expertise it had never met before'.[67] Through no fault of their own, given the immense task they were asked to perform over territory the size of California, the limitations of this ad hoc solution were soon evident. Record notes that it is astounding that 'coalition forces failed to secure the 120-acre Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center' before it was ransacked by people unknown. The site was believed to 'have contained almost two tons of partially enriched uranium'.[68]

The President had insisted on attacking Iraq for fear that the smoking gun following the next attack against America might be a mushroom cloud, the Vice President was insisting there was *no doubt* of Saddam's possession of WMD and his intent to *use them*, and yet the invading force had to fight to assemble a mere brigade at the last minute for finding and securing WMD? Did the military know and just not care about the weak WMD justification for war? Was the Pentagon obsessed with 'finishing the job' started in 1991 regardless of the facts? Or was something else going on?

Some hints might be found in later comments by the civilian leadership of the military. It was only later that Rumsfeld said 'we never – none of us ever believed that they had nuclear weapons. The only real worry was chemical.'[69] Wolfowitz told *Vanity Fair* magazine that WMD was not the most compelling reason for going to war, but that for 'bureaucratic reasons we settled on one issue, WMD, because it was the one reason everyone could agree on'. In the same interview he also admitted that liberating Iraq and stopping 'criminal treatment of the Iraq people' was 'not a reason to put American kids' lives at stake, certainly not on the scale we did it'.[70] In fact, Wolfowitz reveals, the whole affair was simply about overthrowing Saddam. Wolfowitz had chided those who did not understand what a destabilizing influence Saddam had been.

> I said on the record, I don't understand how people can really believe that removing this huge source of instability is going to be a cause of instability in

> the Middle East. I'm not blind to the uncertainties of this situation, but they just seem to be blind to the instability that that son of a bitch was causing. It's as though . . .the only thing to think about was that there might be some inter-communal violence if he were removed.

Relating to the emerging inter-communal violence the interviewer continued 'which also makes you wonder about how much faith there is in spreading democracy.' Incredibly Wolfowitz replied 'probably not very much'.[71]

In civil-military relations political control of the military is a hallmark of an advanced state. Yet relations have always been fraught with tension due to mutual suspicion regarding competency in the art of war, and the high political and human costs of failure. When he was advised that months would be needed to generate a military response to the Taliban and AQ, Secretary Rumsfeld bridled at his advisers.[72] Consequently, at the meeting the day after 9/11, President Bush asked Secretary Rumsfeld what the military could do against Afghanistan, 'very little, effectively' was the reply.[73] The first to respond to the nation's call after 9/11 was the CIA.

Covert teams were immediately dispatched to Afghanistan by Langley to be supported soon thereafter by small parties of US military Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the long arm of the United States Air Force (USAF). Fortuitously, the Northern Alliance, backed by '110 CIA officers and 316 special forces operators. . . combined with massive airpower, to get the job done'.[74]. The military would have to settle for a supporting role after a latter-day Pearl Harbor. 'Rumsfeld had been humiliated' wrote Woodward 'Never again. The next month, when the President ordered him to look seriously at the Iraq war plan, Rumsfeld made it his personal project.'[75]

The war in Iraq is remarkable for the number of major books it has generated while the war continues to unfold. What is astonishing about the emerging canon is that not one book argues that the war was well planned or executed. On the contrary, almost all are an indictment of one or another aspect of the war or its aftermath.[76] *COBRA II*, *State of Denial* and *Fiasco*, among others, details Rumsfeld's extensive and unrelenting intervention in the planning process. Central Command (CENTCOM) had a long-standing contingency plan in the event Saddam attacked south again – Operational Plan (OPLAN) 1003-98. Devised under Marine General Anthony Zinni, OPLAN 1003-98 called for 500,000 troops to undertake a range of tasks, except rebuilding Iraq:

> There was a gaping hole in the occupation annex of the plan. CENTCOM would have the responsibility of general security. But there was no plan for the political administration, restoration of basic services, training of the police, or reconstruction of Iraq.[77]

When advised of the plan's contents Rumsfeld became irritated. He declared that the plan was 'the product of old thinking and the embodiment of everything that was wrong with the military'. It was too heavy on troops, was logistically cumbersome and would take 'far too long to execute'.

> [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Air Force General Richard B.] Myers asked Rumsfeld how many troops he thought might be needed. The defense secretary said in exasperation that he did not see why more than 125,000 would be required and even that was probably too much.[78]

In other words the Secretary was guessing. General Tommy R. Franks (CinC CENTCOM) trimmed the numbers to 380,000 and presented OPLAN 1003-98 again in December 2002. Rumsfeld reacted like no one was listening to him the first time. 'He was not looking to just trim the numbers, but to change the paradigm' observed Gordon and Trainor in their superb history of the war. Putting the lie to Rumsfeld's later defense that he would always take his top generals' advice on troop numbers, when Franks first briefed the plan to the President and noted the new number of 275,000 troops, 'Rumsfeld intervened [and told Bush that] "the number Tom is giving you is soft". Rumsfeld... did not hesitate to call the shots.'.[79] In the end General McKiernan would only receive 'just enough [troops] to make the [combat] plan work'.[80] Military planners usually work on having a 3:1 advantage over the enemy. This plan would give the enemy double that numerical advantage over US forces (6:1).[81] The US military was unquestionably superior to anything the Iraq Army could throw at them, but in an invasion and occupation there is much more to plan than just combat operations.

War colleges teach the phases of war. Phases I–III relate to combat operations. Phase IV marks the transition to securing the peace. As one of the key CENTCOM planners later noted 'there wasn't a whole lot of intellectual energy being focused on Phase IV'.[82] There are at least five reasons for this. First, CENTCOM was planning Iraq while it was fighting on another front in Afghanistan.

Second, the OPLAN was a mature document having evolved over the years. It did not help that Phase IV was absent from the original OPLAN and thus lacked a depth of analysis that was impossible to generate overnight.

Third, in all recent operations the State Department had the Phase IV planning responsibility but this was transferred to Defense, late in the day, on the insistence of Secretary Rumsfeld.

Fourth, Allied planning for the political and economic settlement of World War II started in 1942. The Department of Defense was only authorized to undertake that mission for Iraq on 20 January 2003 (National Security Presidential Directive-24).

Fifth, the inter-agency system, which should have functioned in support of Phase IV, had effectively been overridden by Rumsfeld via NSPD-24, which created confusion regarding roles and responsibilities. In short, it seemed everyone thought someone else was responsible for Phase IV.

Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner was appointed as the head of what became know as the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). He and his staff of 200 worked feverishly from February onwards to come up with some sort of plan. Knowing there were insufficient US forces for the job, Garner planned to use the Iraqi Army for reconstruction projects. He identified nine

tasks for the immediate post-war phase, including paying civil servants, making ministries functional again, restoring basic services like water, sewerage, waste collection, and public health services, through to establishing a local government system.[83] When he met General McKiernan in Baghdad in April, the general added security to Garner's list. But without the once touted international police force at his disposal, Garner had no capability to provide security.

We will never know if the descent to insurgency and civil war would have been halted by the deployment of the 500,000 troops required by OPLAN 1003-98 (a number confirmed by the Joint Staff and the RAND Corporation in their studies before the war). The United States went to war with just enough troops for conventional combat operations but nowhere near enough for other tasks. Before reconstruction, comes security. Counterinsurgency (COIN) hinges on two things, (active or passive) support of the population and external support. At a minimum, borders must be sealed and order must be maintained.[84] With a 6:1 ratio *against* the US-led coalition there was no realistic hope that they could do either of these core COIN tasks even in a low threat environment. The only way out would be massive international cooperation, which was ruled out by American unilateralism, and the use of the approximately 385,000-strong Iraqi armed forces.

## MILITARY STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION

The moment Saddam's statue came down on 9 April 2003 anarchy erupted. It is hard to underestimate how far back the looting set the coalition mission in the country. The breakdown of order created a permissive environment that was later exploited by insurgents. The looting was a major challenge to coalition authority that went unanswered thereby setting the scene for the rest of the occupation.

> A few hours after the American tank toppled the statue... the looters arrived at the Ministry of Industry's ten-story headquarters. Seeing no troops there, the first bands of thieves set upon the concrete-and-glass building like wild animals on a carcass. First to go were computers, telephones... Next came furniture... Then the hard-core scavengers pulled out the wiring and metal ducting from the walls. After two days, the building was torched, sending a plume of smoke billowing into the sky.[85]

This pattern was replayed across the city. Garner's group had a list of key sites and ministries that needed to be protected but nothing was being done. By the time a team got to the Central Bank, for example, it was a smoking ruin, money and ancient Assyrian artifacts were long gone. Every single government agency was stripped bare. Later attempts to establish civil authority floundered on the fact there was simply no infrastructure to facilitate government. Everything was gone or destroyed.

A sine qua non of COIN operations is the maintenance of order. Failing to prevent or halt the ensuing anarchy was bad enough, then Paul Bremer arrived. Bremer was sent out from Washington, on one month's notice, to abruptly take over from Jay Garner in May as Administrator of the new Coalition Provisional

Authority. On arrival Bremer issued two orders that sealed the fate of the American mission to Iraq. General Order number 1 broke up the civil service, including 285,000 in the Ministry of the Interior, which included the Police. General Order number 2 disbanded the 385,000-strong Iraqi armed forces. 'Together, Bremer's two orders threw out of work more than half a million people and alienated many more dependant on those lost incomes', writes Thomas Ricks in *Fiasco*.[86] Bremer's further decisions regarding the break up of Iraqi state industries for privatization and announcing a delay in allowing Iraqi participation in governance arrangements just added fuel to the fire. His first four acts of office went a long way to ensuring that the Iraq project would never succeed. As Chandrasekaran wryly observed, 'with the scrawl of his signature, he created legions of new enemies'.[87] When the breakdown of Baghdad was put before Rumsfeld he brushed it off as nothing and famously quipped, 'stuff happens, freedom's untidy'.

Protests started immediately. Major General Sahib al-Musawi led one of the larger protests and issued the following warning:

> We demand the formation of a government as soon as possible, the restoration of security, rehabilitation of public institutions, and the disbursement of the salaries of all military personnel. If our demands are not met, next Monday will mark the start of estrangement between the Iraqi army and people on the one hand and the occupiers on the other.[88]

In preparation for the war, the Iraqi Army had salted weapons cashes all over the country. Major General Sahib al-Musawi's warning was no idle threat. The CIA station chief summarized General Order number 1 to Bremer thus 'you're going to drive thousand Ba'athists underground by nightfall'.[89] When Chandrasekaran ran into a man he interviewed when covering the protest he asked the man what had happened to his friends, 'did they join the new army? [the man] laughed, "They are all insurgents now. Bremer lost his chance." '[90]

US Naval War College Professor Ahmed Hashim explores the trajectory of the insurgency in his excellent book *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq*.[91] At the time he wrote the book the insurgency was primarily a Sunni affair and he assessed it as such. But much has changed in the short space of time since his book came out. The following summarizes parts of his argument and extends an argument based on current trends.

First, US forces had been led to believe that there would not be much resistance. As Gordon and Trainor explain, it took a while for the columns advancing from Kuwait to recognize that an insurgency was underway and to effectively respond to it.[92] Their *COBRA II* book gives the impression the southern supply lines supporting the rush to Baghdad were dangerously exposed. General William Wallace of US V Corps famously observed to reporters 'the enemy we're fighting is different from the one we'd war gamed against' – a comment that nearly cost him his job.[93]

Second, once Baghdad started to disintegrate and initial indicators suggested the Sunnis were going to lose their privileged position in society, they took up arms to resist this development.

Third, Bremer's edicts turned the US from liberators to occupiers, which fanned Iraqi nationalism and provided America's enemies with a potent *casus belli*.

Fourth, foreign jihadis rushed into Iraq across porous borders to fight the infidel. Some like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, chose to further inflame the situation by instigating sectarian violence when his initial successes against US forces started to wane. He was famously rebuked by AQ's Ayman al-Zawahiri for this strategy because the AQ number two man realized this would divide the insurgency, foment bottomless rivalries between Muslims, and take the focus off the Americans.

Fifth, in reaction, the Shia formed militia, in some cases for their own protection. However, because they had the most to gain under the new system of governance the Americans were instituting, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani urged restraint. Some listened, some did not, including Moqtada al-Sadr, who famously battled US forces in Fallujah and Sadr city before turning his attentions on the Sunni.

Sixth, this action–reaction cycle of violence culminated on 22 February 2006 with the destruction of the holy Shia Askariya (or golden dome) mosque in Samarra. After that, and given the paucity of coalition troop numbers, any remaining hope of preventing civil war collapsed.

What has the US and the new popularly elected government of Iraq done to stem the tide towards civil war? About as much as they could given all the critical past mistakes with which they were saddled. Several tactics were claimed as strategies. 'Clear, hold and build' was popular for a time. It is a good strategy if there are sufficient forces to do the job and the population will support the sacrifice of blood and treasure. In Iraq the reality of this tactic was clear-hold-build-move-come back and start again. In their black humor the justifiably frustrated troops called it whack-a-mole. Then came the $4 billion spent on countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs). While a vital task and worth every penny, this was largely a technical response to a tactical evolution. It was not a strategy. The reality is that for sometime now there has been no change in strategy beyond building up Iraqi units to take over from US forces.

## IRAQ TODAY

The critical challenge in Iraq is the perception and consequences of the occupation and the effectiveness of the central government and its instruments of power. The latest strategy is for 'Iraqi forces to stand up as US forces stand down', in other words, the Iraqi-faction of security. For some time now it as been about the only viable option and both sides have been working very hard to train and deploy Iraqi troops. Long gone are aspirations for the end of history in Iraq in the Fukuyama sense of the term.

The key vulnerability of this strategy rests on the degree to which both the Iraqi government and security forces are compromised by militia pressure and infiltration. The Director of the DIA reported to Congress on this problem on 15 November 2006

> The Ministry of Interior and the police are heavily infiltrated by members of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq or SCIRI's Badr Corps

> and Muqtada al Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi. The Jaysh al-Mahdi often operates under the protection or approval of Iraqi police to detain, torture, and kill suspected Sunni insurgents and innocent Sunni civilians. Sadr continues to refuse any discussion of disbanding his militia. Some clandestine Jaysh al-Mahdi cells likely operate outside Sadr's direct guidance and conduct operations against the Coalition.[94]

Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is a product of, beholden to, and unable to restrain, Moqtada al-Sadr. For example, when US forces attacked the Sadr militia unannounced, al-Maliki publicly rebuked the US, whereas he has been silent when other militia were interdicted by US forces in the same way.[95] The events tied to that situation show beyond doubt that al-Maliki is compromised, a fact later acknowledged by the US national security adviser in a classified assessment leaked in November 2006.[96] The situation is grave in light of the fact that there is no better alternative prime minister than Maliki. Likewise at the tactical level, news reports are full of stories of militia dressed as (or legitimately part of) Iraqi police or army units, running riot across the country. All the plans for disarming the militia have been ignored because the central government is split across sectarian and militia lines and there is no one source of authority that is capable of regaining control of Iraq. That includes coalition forces.

'War... cannot be considered to have ended so long as the enemy's *will* has not been broken' writes Clausewitz, 'we may occupy a country completely, but hostilities can be renewed again in the interior, or perhaps with allied help.'[97] The US is as unable to control Baghdad as the Iraq government because of the passions stirred by the occupation. Hashim's book focuses on the centrality of the occupation to generating and sustaining the insurgency.[98] His research is backed by poll data. Nearly three quarters of the Iraqi population want an immediate withdrawal of US forces according to both a US State Department poll and credible private surveys.[99]

Yet the great dilemma is that there seems little doubt a convulsive eruption of violence will sweep Iraq when US-led forces leave. If coalition forces stay there will be trouble, if they leave there will be double. That seems to indicate that the tipping point towards a wider conflagration in Iraq has already passed. Prior to that point, the possibility of radically increasing the number of US troops across the country might have enjoyed some success but it has to be recognized that with more troops comes greater resistance to the occupation. It is a negative spiral. As one of those polled said 'of course we want the Americans to leave, but if they do it ill be a great disaster for us... there will be lakes of blood'.[100] This was a common, if paradoxical, observation.

## DANGERS

While 14 of 18 provinces are relatively stable, there is a nascent civil war in Baghdad that has the potential to spread to other provinces. 'Currently around 80 percent of the sectarian violence in Iraq happens within a 35-mile radius of Baghdad.'[101] Overall, whether through the ballot or the bullet, the majority Shia were

always the ones who stood the most to gain by unseating Saddam. In the long term this proposition still holds but given the trajectory of the insurgency the notion of 'gain' in Iraq could well become moot. If the government and security forces are as weak and compromised as they appear, and coalition attempts to maintain or restore order are either impracticable or inflammatory, then no matter what interim measures are put in place Iraq is going to implode. The task then is to minimize the degree to which it explodes.

The US does not have the military capacity, political will, or endless deficit, to dramatically escalate its commitment to Iraq. Even if it did, its pretty clear from past events that the likelihood is that more US 'occupiers' would just further embitter all sides against America. If the US leaves immediately the subsequent security vacuum will be filled with visions of Rwanda on the Euphrates. If the US has a phased withdrawal the same thing will happen, just in slow motion. Clearly many more young American lives will be lost under any circumstances short of immediate withdrawal.

The problems do not end there. The 2006 NIE reminds readers that 'Iran and Syria remain the most active state sponsors of terrorism'.[102] Both have been emboldened by the insurgency in Iraq when originally the idea was to put pressure on them by making Iraq the shining city on the Mideast hill. Indeed, they both helped torch the city and spread the embers to Lebanon and beyond. Turning to them for assistance as proposed by the Baker–Hamilton Iraq Study Group would be like the Soviets asking the US to help it win Afghanistan in the 1980s.

There is also the very real and serious threat of finally realizing the domino theory – but this time Islamic fundamentalism replaces Asian communism. The Shia minority states of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council, are deeply worried about the fallout from Iraq. Saddam was not the only ruler in the region to be hard on the Shia. As the Shia gain ascendancy in Iraq it is inevitable that pressure will grow beyond Iraq's borders for change. Just imagine the consequences if AQ or Iran manage to spread instability among the politically fragile states of the Gulf. Pulling back US troops into any of these states would only escalate internal tensions and provide a focus for anti-US forces.

Likewise, Israel now finds itself in a much more unstable region with growing pressure from the US and Britain to compromise on the Palestinian question and thereby buy much needed political capital for its closest ally the US. Should a domino or two collapse, the impact on the world economy would be profound, let alone the opportunity it would afford America's fundamentalist enemies to attack the homeland.

Finally, and of as much, if not greater concern, is the danger of the creation of an Afghanistan-like sanctuary for anti-US forces inside Iraq. The key difference between the two locales is the oil wealth available in the latter. Thus protected and funded, AQ and others would have a very strong basis from which to mount attacks against the US homeland. As the recent testimony of the directors of DIA and CIA to Congress make painfully clear this remains the source of the most direct threat to the US.[103]

## OPTIONS?

Is there a middle way between massive US troop increases and immediate withdrawal – both of which are not currently acceptable options as noted above? Given that 14 out of 18 provinces are relatively stable, the economy is growing, and 80 percent of violence occurs in or around Baghdad, it is easy to understand the allure of the often-touted breakup of Iraq solution. The problem is that a loose confederation or complete devolution would not stop, and may not even isolate, the nascent civil war in Baghdad.

Indeed, the middle way is the option the US is currently pursuing. General John Abizaid the CENTCOM Commander testified to Congress on 15 November 2006 that:

> Our commanders and diplomats believe it is possible to achieve an end state in Iraq that finds Iraq at peace with its neighbors, an ally in the war against extremists, respectful of the lives and rights of its citizens, and with security forces sufficient to maintain order, prevent terrorist safe havens and defend the independence of Iraq.[104]

His policy prescription to attain this end revolves around hastening and growing extant efforts to strengthen the Iraqi security services that have now been under way for well over a year. This policy prescription also meshes with the Iraq Study Group recommendations. However the optimism cited is hard to square with the assessment of the DIA:

> Recent Coalition and ISF [Iraqi Security Force] operations in Baghdad have achieved limited success... Attacks against civilians... continue to increase. Political leaders' inability to resolve key issues ...contribute to...fueling support for terrorist and insurgent groups. The perception of unchecked violence is creating an atmosphere of fear and hardening sectarianism, which is empowering militias and vigilante groups, hastening middle-class exodus, and shaking confidence in government and security forces. Sectarian violence, a weak central government, problems in basic services, and high unemployment are causing more Iraqis to turn to sectarian groups, militias, and insurgents for basic needs, imperiling Iraqi unity.[105]

General Abizaid did not outline a fallback plan in the event DIA and CIA assessments were closer to the path of events. Nor should Congress expect him to signal his intentions to America's enemies. However, if the end state to which he refers is out of reach then consideration has to be given to doing something other than attempting to bolster the Iraqi army and police.

A final, deeply Machiavellian, option would be the 'give war a chance' option. Luttwak's thesis is simple 'an unpleasant truth often overlooked is that although war is a great evil, it does have a great virtue: it can resolve political conflicts and lead to peace'.[106] The more outsiders restrain internal conflicts the more prolonged they become. This option would focus on enhancing the divisions between America's

opponents and pitting one against the other while US-led forces slipped quietly out of harm's way. Dividing enemies and encouraging them to focus on one another was the basis of the idea behind US policy toward the Iran–Iraq War. It would be easily sold on the basis that all the parties concerned wanted US forces out. Moreover, a major conflict inside Iraq may well be inevitable at this point. If civil war is inevitable, why not let it be the arbiter of the complex issues that have thus far eluded any other solution. A net benefit of this approach would put real pressure on Iran, which has to date ignored diplomatic pressure – witness its nuclear programs.[107] Of course there are many downsides to this approach, not the least of which is the possibility of blowback – a future unforeseen problem emerging from today's short term solution.

The fact that none of these options is appealing should come as no surprise. For decades the US leadership has suspected that invading Iraq would end in a quagmire and civil war:

> I think for us to get American military personnel involved in a civil war inside Iraq would literally be a quagmire. Once we got to Baghdad, what would we do? Who would we put in power? What kind of government would we have? Would it be a Sunni government, a Shia government, a Kurdish government? Would it be secular along the lines of the Ba'ath Party? Would it be fundamentalist Islamic? I do not think the United States wants to have U.S. military forces accept casualties and accept the responsibility of trying to govern Iraq. I think it makes no sense at all. If you don't have a clear-cut military objective, if you're not prepared to use overwhelming force to achieve it, then we don't have any business committing U.S. military forces into that civil war.[108]

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney knew the risks back in 1991.

The reality is that there is no easy solution. The main lesson of this story is that there are limits to US power; that wars of choice are fraught with potential pitfalls; that the morality (in the Clausewitzian sense) of the decision to use force matters and relates directly to the contest of wills; that force should only be used when it has a high degree of probability it will deliver an acceptable *political* outcome (which is a function of the context of wills); that the cost of war does not outweigh the risk; and that the ends justify the means. When there is confusion about the ends sought, as arguably was the case in this instance, the moral basis for action is undermined from the start. No level of operational prowess, as has consistently been demonstrated by US forces, can mask strategic error. Colin Gray makes this point eloquently when he writes 'tactical and operational military prowess is easily squandered if battles are ill-chosen, campaigns are wrongly pointed, and war is ill-conceived'.[109]

Clausewitz repeatedly cautions strategists to be clear about the nature of war and the objectives the use of force is designed to achieve. 'Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in *magnitude* and also in *duration*.

Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced.'[110] Compared to hunting down and eliminating AQ, the threat to the US from Iraq was negligible. The war in Iraq was a war of choice. The risks of invading and occupying Iraq were well know to the principal decision makers. Iraq had not attacked the United States. US national survival was not at stake in this war. AQ does not threaten national survival but the threat is not too far short of that if AQ ever becomes able to mount multiple simultaneous attacks using WMD. Imagine here the consequences of Hurricane 'Katrina' times three. Because of this, the sacrifices the nation was willing to make for the Iraq policy was never going to be as high as the sacrifices it would be prepared to make to attack and defeat AQ. However having squandered blood and treasure on a very high cost high risk strategy in Iraq, the nation's will to continue the fight against the real enemy will be diminished at a time when those enemies are growing in power and number in part because of the war in Iraq.

## GRAND STRATEGY

The net assessment of the US intelligence community is that the war in Iraq has made AQ and AQ-related groups stronger. The 2006 NIE assessed that:

> the Iraqi jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders [and that because of the war in Iraq the global jihadist movement is spreading] in both number and geographic dispersion... The Iraq conflict has become the 'cause célèbre' for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.[111]

General Abizaid, the CENTCOM Commander's assessment is clear 'failure to stabilize Iraq could increase Iranian aggressiveness and embolden al-Qaida's ideology. It could also deepen broader Sunni–Shia fissures throughout the region'.[112] The Director of the CIA added, 'an al-Qa'ida victory in Iraq would mean a fundamentalist state that shelters jihadists and serves as a launching pad for terrorist operations throughout the region —and in the United States'.[113] In short, the stakes could not be higher.

At the same time AQ continues to enjoy 'physical safe haven in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area'. According to the Director of the CIA 'this safe haven gives al-Qa'ida the physical — and psychological — space needed to meet, train, expand its networks, and prepare new attacks'. Had the political capital and military forces deployed to Iraq instead been focused on this safe haven perhaps the threat to the US homeland would be substantially less today? Certainly world and US public opinion would have understood this strategy; it would have been in retaliation to the attacks on the US and therefore would not require the cover of a complicated high-risk preemption strategy (which was arguably really a prevention strategy); it had a chance of reducing the very high threat to the US; it would have undermined if not disabled the 'moral' basis of AQ; and it would have a demonstration effect to those who might seek to emulate AQ's initial success.

Notwithstanding war weariness, the United States must refocus its strategic attention on AQ. In the longer term, attention also has to be paid to the great game which has continued apace while Goliath has been tied down by the Lilliputians.

## NOTES

1. President George W. Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat, Cincinnati Museum Center, 7 Oct. 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021007-8.html> .
2. President George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington DC: The White House 2002) p.15.
3. The rejection of offensive war as a sovereign right (option) culminated in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations (UN) but had various antecedents including the League of Nations and the Concert. The trend in international norms and law that led to the UN charter is widely accepted to have its origins in the rejection of Napoleon's adventurism by his conquerors. See F.H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace* (Cambridge: CUP 1963) p.213 and *passim*.
4. Bush (note 2).
5. Dept. of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, <www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/index.html> , quoted in Jeffrey Record, *Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2004) p.34.
6. Record (note 6) p.35.
7. John Adams, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Part 1, Article XXX, adopted in 1780, <www.mass.gov/legis/const.htm> .
8. Thomas Paine, *Common Sense* [1776] (London: Penguin 1976) p.98.
9. Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (New York: Free Press 2004) p.200.
10. Bush (note 2) p.14.
11. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, *The Age of Sacred Terror* (New York: Random House 2002) p. 385.
12. Bruce Lawrence, *Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden* (New York: Verso 2005) p.183.
13. Ibid. p.240.
14. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, trans. and ed. M. Howard and P. Paret, 8th ed. (Princeton UP 1984) p.597.
15. Ibid. p.579.
16. Bush, 'Outlines Iraqi Threat' (note 2).
17. President George W. Bush, 'The State of the Union Address', Capitol Building: Washington DC, 28 Jan. 2003, emphasis added <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html> .
18. Ibid.
19. Lawrence (note 12) pp.52 and 234.
20. Ibid. p.118.
21. Ibid. pp.234–5.
22. Clausewitz (note 14) p.77.
23. Ibid. p.93
24. 'X' (George Kennan), 'The Sources of Soviet Conduct', *Foreign Affairs* 25 (July 1947) pp.566–83.
25. Lawrence (note 12) p.48.
26. This is interesting because it suggests Afghan mujahedin were fighting in Somalia. Lawrence (note 12) pp.54–5, emphasis added.
27. Professor Fawaz Gerges explains 'Al-Hijaz is the western province of Saudi Arabia where Mecca and Medina are located. He appears to be referring to expelling the U.S. military presence from Arabia, but U.S. forces are normally stationed in the eastern provinces. By specifying al-Hijaz bin Laden is misleading naïve viewers into thinking that American troops are in physical control of Mecca and Medina.' Fawaz A. Gerges, *Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (Cambridge: CUP 2005) p.85.
28. Lawrence (note 12) p.241.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. p.242.

31. Regarding the 'new Rome' label see Lawrence (note 12) p.212.
32. Clausewitz (note 14) pp.88–9.
33. Clarke (note 9) pp.30–1.
34. Ibid. (note 10) pp.30–4. See also Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006) p.77.
35. Powell never explicitly rejected the idea, he only warned against its consequences.
36. Record (note 6) p.20.
37. James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*: *The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (London: Penguin 2004) p.212.
38. Ibid. p.211.
39. Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) pp.11–12.
40. Paul Wolfowitz, 'The United States and Iraq', in John Calabrese (ed.), *The Future of Iraq* (Washington DC: Middle East Institute Press 1997) p.111.
41. Zalmay Khalilzad and Paul Wolfowitz, 'Overthrow Him', *Weekly Standard*, 1 Dec.1997.
42. Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (New York: Pantheon Books 2006) pp.13–14.
43. Ibid. p.13.
44. Kenneth Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (New York: Random House 2002) p.105.
45. Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2002) pp.83–5.
46. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.17.
47. Clarke (note 9) pp.32–3.
48. Ibid., p.30. Emphasis added.
49. Ron Suskind has argued that Vice President Cheney was so shaken by 9/11 that he lost his perspective and ability to take the long view evident in much of his long career in public service. Consequently, Cheney would be concerned about a possible threat even if there was a only a 'one percent chance' it might materialize. This would explain why evidence of a link between Saddam and AQ was not necessary to justify war against Iraq. For Cheney, there mere abstract possibility was enough evidence. See the argument in Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine* (New York: Simon & Schuster 2006), *passim*.
50. President George W. Bush, 'Remarks by President Bush and President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia in Photo Opportunity', The Oval Office, 25 Sept. 2002 <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020925-1.html> .
51. Vice President Richard Cheney, 'Remarks by the Vice President to the Heritage Foundation', 10 Oct. 2003, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031010-1.html> .
52. President George W Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat (note 1).
53. Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'Addresses the UN Security Council', 5 Feb. 2003, <www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html#42> .
54. US State Dept., *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000* (Washington DC, 30 April 2001), 'Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism', <www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2000/2441.htm> .
55. Mann (note 37) p.310. Note here also the inductive logic – looking for evidence to match the hypothesis. National security intelligence so derived is more likely to be fallible when it is cherry picked to suit an argument rather than forming a view based on the evidence.
56. Secretary of State Colin Powell, 'Secretary Powell's Press Conference', 8 Jan. 2004, State Dept., Washington DC, <www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/28008.htm> .
57. President George W. Bush, Press Conference by the President, White House, Washington DC, 21 Aug. 2006, < www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060821.html> .
58. Pew Research Centre Poll, 'Americans Thinking About Iraq, But Focused on the Economy', 10 Oct. 2002, <http://people-press.org/reports/display.php3?PageID = 645> .
59. *Washington Post* poll cited in Record (note 6) p.128.
60. Clausewitz (note 14) p.600.
61. 'Rumsfeld foresees swift Iraq war', BBC News, 7 Feb. 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2738089.stm> .
62. Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) pp.92–6, 100–3. See corroborating story in Gordon and Trainor (note 42) pp.78–83.
63. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.129.
64. Quoted in Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) p.92, emphasis added.
65. Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) p.101.

66. Ibid. pp.102–3.
67. Gordon and Trainor (note 43) p.82.
68. Record (note 6) p.103.
69. Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) p.102.
70. Record (note 6) pp.76 and 112.
71. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with Sam Tannenhaus, *Vanity Fair*, Friday 9 May 2003, <www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html> .
72. Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) p.77.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid. p.78.
75. Ibid. p.79.
76. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone* (NY: Random House 2006); Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror* (NY: Free Press 2004); Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq* (NY: Times Books 2005); James Fallows, *Blind into Baghdad: America's War in Iraq* (NY: Vintage 2006); Peter W. Galbraith, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End* (NY: Simon & Schuster 2006); Michael R. Gordon and Gen. Bernard E. Trainor, *COBRA II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq* (NY: Pantheon Books 2006); Ahmed S. Hashim, *Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq* (NY: Cornell University Press 2006); James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (London: Penguin 2004); Kenneth Pollack, *The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq* (NY: Random House 2002); Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco*: *The American Military Adventure in Iraq* (NY: Penguin Press 2006); George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (NY: Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2006); David L. Phillips, *Losing Iraq: Inside The Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco* (NY: Perseus Books 2006); Jeffrey Record, *Dark Victory: America's Second War Against Iraq* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2004); Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine* (NY: Simon & Schuster 2006); Bob Woodward, *State of Denial* (NY: Simon & Schuster 2006).
77. Gordon and Trainor (note 42) p.27.
78. Ibid. p.4.
79. Ibid. p.32.
80. Ibid. p.98.
81. Ibid.. p.110.
82. Ibid. p.140.
83. Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) p.179.
84. See for two classic examples Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* [orig. *La guerre moderne* 1961] (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2006); and David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2006).
85. Chandrasekaran (note 76) p.77.
86. Ricks (note 76) p.163.
87. Chandrasekaran (note 76) p.76.
88. Woodward, *State of Denial* (note 34) p.206.
89. Chandrasekaran (note 76) p.71.
90. Ibid. p.77.
91. Hashim (note 76).
92. See in particular their discussion of the battle for Nasiriyah.
93. Hashim (note 76) p.15.
94. Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples, US Army, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record, US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wednesday, 15 Nov. 2006, <armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427> .
95. 'US Iraqi forces raid radical Shiite stronghold of Sadr City', an Associated Press report, on ABC News, 25 Oct. 2006, <www.abcactionnews.com/stories/2006/10/061025iraq.shtml> .
96. Assessment of 8 Nov. 2006, leaked to *New York Times*, see <www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/29/news/web.1129text.php> .
97. Clausewitz (note 14) p.90 emphasis in the original.
98. Hashim (note 76).
99. See Amit R. Paley, 'Most Iraqis favor immediate US pullout, Poll shows', *Washington Post*, 27 Sept. 2006, p.22.

100. Ibid.
101. Gen. John Abizaid, US Army, CENTCOM Commander, Statement for the Record, US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wed. 15 Nov. 2006, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427> .
102. Director of National Intelligence, 'Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States', (April 2006), <www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf> .
103. Testimony given to the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wed., 15 Nov. 2006, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427> .
104. Gen. John Abizaid (note 102).
105. Lt. Gen. Maples (note 94).
106. Edward N. Luttwak, 'Give War a Chance', *Foreign Affairs* 78/4 (July/Aug. 1999) p.1.
107. It should be remembered here that Iran's influence is limited inside Iraq by the Persian–Arab divide.
108. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, TV interview, 'This Week with David Brinkley', ABC network, 7 April 1991.
109. On the dimensions of strategy see Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: OUP 1999), Chapter 1, for this quote, p.6.
110. Clausewitz (note 15) p.92, emphasis in the original.
111. Director of National Intelligence, *Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States* (April 2006), <www.dni.gov/press_releases/Declassified_NIE_Key_Judgments.pdf> .
112. Gen. John Abizaid (note 102).
113. Gen. Michael V. Hayden, US Air Force, Director CIA, Statement for the Record, US Senate Armed Services Committee, Wed., 15 Nov. 2006, <http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id = 2427> .