

## 7. U.S. Intelligence Programs to Counter Proliferation

In this section, U.S. Intelligence activities and programs to counter proliferation, including strategic and operational planning processes, are briefly described, along with some intelligence successes achieved to date. Additional, more detailed information may be found in the Intelligence Annex to this report.

### 7.1 Introduction: Relevant ACEs and U.S. Intelligence Strategy Objectives

U.S. Intelligence has received clear and concise policy guidance for conducting its intelligence activities. This guidance begins with Presidential Decision Directives that address weapons and related technology proliferation, including, for example, nuclear smuggling. Additional guidance comes from annual congressional Defense and Intelligence Authorization and Appropriation Acts, reports to Congress by U.S. Government agencies on countering proliferation activities, and DoD counterproliferation policy and military mission objectives. These outline a national nonproliferation strategy centered around four key aspects: i) prevent the acquisition of NBC/M; ii) roll back existing NBC/M capabilities; iii) deter NBC/M use; and iv) adapt military forces and emergency assets to respond to NBC/M threats.

A focused set of enduring intelligence needs has been developed in response to the policy guidance reflected in the four aspects of U.S. nonproliferation strategy cited above. These enduring intelligence needs are used to chart the progress of U.S. Intelligence in making use of existing capabilities and in defining and developing areas for new investments.

U.S. Intelligence is working to provide accurate, comprehensive, timely, and actionable foreign intelligence on a broad policy and enforcement front. This has included:

- Support to policy makers responsible for extending and implementing nonproliferation regimes;
- Support to DoD efforts to counter the threat posed by biological and chemical weapons; and
- Maintaining a surge capability to quickly deploy specialists outside the U.S. to the scene of a terrorist nuclear or radiological threat to provide the U.S. Mission and host government advice and guidance on dealing with the threat. (During such an incident, the specialists would coordinate fully with the appropriate U.S. Government agencies, keeping them informed and drawing upon their expertise should follow-up action be required.)

***Strategic Planning Process.*** U.S. Intelligence has instituted a corporate strategic planning and evaluation process to support efforts to counter proliferation. This process contributes to the Intelligence Community's National Needs Process and the National Foreign Intelligence Program

(NFIP), the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) Program and Planning Guidance. A major benefit of this effort has been the placement of a significant number of DoD personnel within the DCI's Nonproliferation Center (NPC). This has helped integrate intelligence support to DoD counterproliferation needs and actions. U.S. Intelligence also has expanded its relations with the law enforcement community. Both the FBI and the U.S. Customs Service have assigned senior agents to the NPC to assist in developing initiatives to counter proliferation activities. The NPC is also working to enhance information sharing technologies and resources in support of the law enforcement community's nonproliferation efforts.

As the threat of proliferation has increased, U.S. Intelligence capabilities to support nonproliferation efforts have been redirected or expanded and now include:

- Assessing the intentions and plans of proliferating nations;
- Identifying NBC/M programs and clandestine transfer networks set up to obtain controlled materials or launder money;
- Supporting diplomatic, law enforcement, and military efforts to counter proliferation;
- Providing direct support for multilateral initiatives and security regimes; and
- Overcoming denial and deception practices established by proliferators to conceal their programs.

U.S. Intelligence has taken or participated in actions to address the overall challenges facing U.S. nonproliferation efforts, including:

- Identifying funds to maintain technical intelligence collection programs related to NBC/M tests;
- Fostering the development of new technologies with the potential to improve the ability to detect NBC/M activities at significantly longer ranges than possible today;
- Establishing relationships to enhance cooperation between U.S. Intelligence and R&D components;
- Redirecting and reorganizing intelligence activities to increase and sharpen the focus of nonproliferation-related efforts, both analytically and operationally; and
- Redirecting programs to assist the FBI and U.S. Customs Service efforts to identify, target, and apprehend individuals engaged in the trafficking and smuggling of nuclear materials worldwide.

**Operational Planning Process.** The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is linking counterproliferation intelligence production more directly to the CINCs' Deliberate Planning Process. DIA is taking guidance from the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and direction from the Commands' J-2s (Intelligence), J-3s (Operations), and J-5s (Plans and Policy) to allow U.S. Intelligence to more clearly define and satisfy the intelligence needed to support CINC counterproliferation contingency planning and operations.

**Intelligence Successes to Date.** Many of U.S. Intelligence's successes cannot be described in this unclassified setting. The Intelligence Annex to this report contains a more thorough discussion of the activities and successes of U.S. Intelligence. However, some that can be described here include:

- Support to efforts of the Department of State to provide actionable intelligence to the UN Special Commission's inspection and monitoring efforts in Iraq;
- Development of a list of indicators to alert collectors and analysts that CW and BW are about to be used; similar initiatives are also underway to provide early warning alerts for the possible diversion of nuclear materials;
- Support to Congressional committees, including a report that reviewed and evaluated nonproliferation programs in the NFIP FY 1998 budget submission; and
- Development of a detailed set of information needs to guide intelligence collection and analysis, known as *Nonproliferation: Compendium of Country-Specific Priority Intelligence Needs and Actions*.

But even if all of the intelligence accomplishments could be listed, the intelligence community recognizes that there is more to do. Over the next year, U.S. Intelligence will continue to:

- Strengthen and focus its integrated collection strategy;
- Work to enhance the intelligence community's information processing capabilities;
- Implement unified and standardized information systems, to include shared access by intelligence and consumer organizations;
- Strengthen and broaden foreign language training and support tools;
- Continue to review and evaluate new methodologies and technologies; and
- As part of the DCI and Secretary of Defense joint program and budget reviews, continue to evaluate intelligence resources and capabilities for optimal support for actions to counter proliferation.

The danger of NBC use is taken seriously by U.S. Intelligence. It has not been long since the poison gas attack in the Tokyo subway. Press reporting in the U.S. focused on the possibility of a similar attack happening here. U.S. Intelligence fully recognizes that after-the-fact efforts are not adequate – it is necessary to stop NBC attacks before they occur. Intelligence is the key. U.S. Intelligence has added resources to its efforts over the last few years as the threat has increased, and it will continue to do all it can to meet the needs of its policy, defense, and enforcement customers and to protect the American public at home and abroad.

## **7.2 Status and Accomplishments of U.S. Intelligence Programs to Counter Proliferation**

Descriptions of the status and accomplishments of U.S. Intelligence programs to counter proliferation, including details of new initiatives and an overview of capability shortfalls and areas for progress, can be found in the Intelligence Annex to this report.