


DECISION PHASE

Quick decisions are unsafe decisions.
-Sophocles, 495-406 BC, Oedipus Tyrannus



WE CAN SELDOM, IF EVER, directly implement the results of analysis without further considerations. Were it otherwise, an executive decision maker would need nothing beyond analytical skills. The ability to use analysis critically is important, but no more so than several other capabilities. Among these are your ability to understand the overall context of a problem and how your piece fits with others, the long-term paths of your and other organizations and how your decision will affect those trajectories. Also, the politics and rule sets of your organization and its ability to accept risk and take certain kinds of actions will affect which solutions are culturally acceptable. Competition for resources—the opportunity costs of adopting your preferred solution—and their effect on other decisions will influence what is possible and what is not.

All these considerations arise because our decisions and recommendations are viewed in the organizational context of changing budgets, deadlines, priorities, timetables, and bureaucratic interests. Before we can evaluate our alternatives, we must translate them so they address these aspects of the organizational environment. As we do so, we recognize there are several reasons why our analytically-produced results require additional assessment and massaging by someone with a broader perspective before we make a decision.

First, we revisit the Definition Phase and ask whether the problem that initiated our decision making still exists in its original form. What *exactly* is the problem in your view or that of the decision makers over you? We also review the Analysis Phase. Are the costs of the alternative favored by analysis acceptable to our organization's culture? Does the organization have the capability to implement the analytically-produced result? Based on your professional experience, is the analytically-produced result realistic or is it too academic, artificial, impractical, or impolitic? Do we need to implement our alternative all at once or can we break it into increments and implement it over time? We will also look ahead to the Reconciliation Phase. Will others, with different interests, embrace the solution we prefer? These non-analytical factors may make the so-called optimal alternative impractical or infeasible. We are then left to choose

among alternatives that, although not analytically ideal, will still produce progress toward the organization's objective.

In this chapter, we examine the steps we take to turn the results of analysis into an implementable decision or recommendation. First, there are the important preparatory actions we take before we settle upon an option. Then, we must look at the ramifications of our choice. Finally, we prepare for the Reconciliation Phase.

The Department of Defense's Organizational Culture

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, joint staffs, defense agencies, and service headquarters all have characteristics that can make translating analysis into decisions either easier or more difficult. The DoD's bureaucratic character provides us with clarity in our organizational relationships. It values rational comparisons based upon cost and benefit, although not only those two criteria. The Department of Defense's formal structure facilitates specialization within organizations, permits advocacy and consensus among them, and provides a standing mechanism for adjudication when we cannot achieve consensus. DoD aspires to be an objective organization that rewards the best ideas and superior performance impartially and, though it inevitably falls short of this ideal, DoD comes much closer than most large organizations in this regard.

The Department of Defense is, however, an essentially conservative organization that prefers an incremental approach to problem solving. It is subject to outside political influences when making important program and policy decisions, sometimes at the expense of its own rationality. One of the premises of analytical decision making is that we have executive decision makers and organizations that are receptive to choosing courses of action based largely on their own costs and benefits. While no decision maker sets out to be irrational, other pressures may begin to crowd out his or her use of objective criteria, even on complex topics and in situations when adequate time is available for study and reflection. Alternatively, some people find decision making itself stressful and minimize their stress by making hasty decisions, small decisions, or no decision at all. Decision making is also risky, and some individuals are very risk averse. DoD has no particular exclusion from these decision-making foibles.

The art and science of executive decision making consist of giving each of these analytical and organizational factors the weight it deserves to arrive at a sound decision that is affordable, politically acceptable, and within the capabilities of our organization to absorb and implement. If the decision maker overemphasizes the analytical, he or she may select an alternative that is impractical for execution. The price of overly weighting organizational and political considerations is to choose alternatives that do not meet national security requirements and that steal precious resources from alternatives that do.

Decision Making Preparations

Good decision making is hard work. The process of using an orderly and rigorous decision-making framework and making a well-considered decision, especially in complex situations, is mentally demanding. We best prepare for making an important decision by reviewing the earlier phases of the framework to see whether anything has changed substantially since we began the process. Next, we ensure that we understand the spillover effects of selecting each alternative, and we examine the timing of our decision in the context of the problem.

OMISSIONS IN EARLIER PHASES

We framed the decision in the Definition Phase; now we review the elements we identified there to ensure nothing important has changed. We need to revalidate the problem statement and the decision objective: do we understand the decision maker's perspective or do we need more guidance? Is the problem still a problem, and is the problem statement consistent with that of the senior leadership? This is especially salient for problems that have a large political component. A political event may have triggered the need for a decision. But by the time the analysis is complete, the politics may have changed or the urgency may have dissipated. That may mean that senior leadership is now less likely to select an alternative that is a major departure from the status quo. Also, we may have formed some insights during the Analysis Phase that encourage us to adjust some aspects of the Definition Phase, i.e., we may shift some influences from external to internal or modify some problem boundaries.

In the Analysis Phase, we simplified a complex problem and applied criteria to identify the differences among alternatives and to identify our preferences among them. Necessarily, we omitted many aspects of the problem because analysis must always simplify. Now, during the Decision Phase, we need to check back to ensure that the assumptions, simplifications, and methodology we used are still appropriate for this problem and that we understand the outcomes, risk, and uncertainty of each alternative.

Thus, what we are asking at the beginning of the Decision Phase is: *Are there any major factors that we failed to address in the earlier phases that we need to consider before reaching a decision?* For example, suppose we are deciding how to reduce the costs to the Department of Defense for military family housing. One analysis used two cost criteria: member out-of-pocket expenses and cost to DoD. The least costly option to DoD, according to another analysis, is to eliminate military family housing outright and replace it with increased housing allowances that vary with location. The second study did not, however, evaluate the relative impact of this policy on different pay grades. This option will hit junior married enlisted members much harder than it will senior officers if we implement the analysis-based recommendation. The analysis does not reflect that disparity. It is not in error, it is simply incomplete. We need to stop the process and analyze some additional criteria about the consequences of each alternative on personnel before we make a decision. We also need to discuss the importance of this issue with the senior leadership.

We should note, also, whether we can combine features from different alternatives to create a new one with important advantages. Good executive decision makers seldom simply accept the alternatives as presented by the analysts.

SILLOVER EFFECTS

As we discussed in Chapter 9, our choice of a program or policy alternative may have important side effects, intended or otherwise. An expensive weapons program may preclude purchasing or upgrading other systems (opportunity cost). Defense resource allocation decisions seldom occur in isolation.

What are the spillovers effects from each alternative? If we increase a tactical aircraft wing's training sortie rate to improve its bombing accuracy, the additional sorties affect more than aircrew schedules and air operations. The change will also affect ground operations, maintenance schedules, target range management, and logistics planning for fuel, ammunition, and parts consumption. If we cannot change the number of flight hours per month, aircrew proficiency in an-

other area, e.g., aerial combat maneuvers or long-range navigation, will suffer. We have to think beyond our immediate expectations and consider spillover consequences, positive and negative.

Other important spillovers are organizational in nature. Every organization has limits to what it can absorb and implement. These limits may be driven by the competence of specific individuals or groups. They may be the products of important organizational traditions that clash with our choice of the analytically-optimal solution. These rule sets may cause decision makers to balk because a prominent mission or community may be diminished. Whenever our analysis recommends that we adopt a disruptive technology, antennas go up immediately to detect threats to existing organizational rice bowls; many will be more comfortable perfecting existing systems and doctrine rather than embracing change.

Organizational resistance to change, especially in the form of a disruptive technology, is nothing new. In between the world wars, the resistance to air power within the U.S. Navy by the proponents of battleships (the “Gun Club”) was legendary, literally the subject of Hollywood movies.¹ The dispute whether air or surface power would dominate naval warfare continued until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor decided the issue in favor of air power. Led predominantly by conservative battleship admirals, during the 1930s the U.S. Navy committed enormous resources to construct new battleships for the Two-Ocean Navy. The battleships, in terms of opportunity cost, were built at the expense of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships; during the war they served important but secondary roles as aircraft carrier escorts and shore bombardment platforms. But to their credit, the admirals hedged, albeit forced by Congress and a vocal minority within the service. With the huge increases in defense spending before the United States entered World War II, they also commissioned the large class of fleet aircraft carriers that came to dominate the Pacific War.

Today, DoD is considering many new, potentially disruptive technologies and organizations, e.g., unmanned combat vehicles, light armored systems, and information technology enhanced warfighter networks, at a time when we cannot fully fund both traditional and new paths simultaneously. Because every organization's culture is strongly linked to its core competencies, we may be forced to adjust or even discard a good analytical alternative if it threatens that culture too severely.

TIMING

We can make poor decisions by deciding too soon without enough information or by deciding too late, after the decision is overcome by other events. The urgency and the importance of the decision situation are often self-evident and may determine the timing of our decision by themselves; Washington deadlines are as immutable as time and tide. Otherwise-elective decisions may require our immediate attention unless we are willing to let another organization take the initiative on this issue. The nature of the decision objective influences our timing and tactics, encouraging us to act now or to delay and wait for a more opportune moment. We must understand whether a decision is time-sensitive and what the consequences of delay are. *Should we decide now?*

We may delay a decision for additional study; if so, we must specify the new information we require and decide how the delay affects the overall issue and our interests. Do we have the resources (including time) to analyze this decision further? In the early 1990s, all four services

1. For example, see 1949's *Task Force* wherein Gary Cooper and Walter Brennan lobby Navy leaders and Congress in an uphill fight to fund the first U.S. aircraft carriers and develop modern carrier aircraft before World War II.

were exploring ways to incorporate Information Warfare into their doctrines. While the other services performed a range of studies, the U.S. Air Force stood up two Information Warfare squadrons. Air Force leadership made this decision with imperfect knowledge of how they intended to employ information warfare, but these specialized exploratory units made the Air Force the pacesetter in DoD; their philosophy and systems became DoD standards that other services had to accept or work to change. This decisiveness gave the Air Force an important, tangible edge in shaping the way DoD regards information warfare.

Referring an issue to a committee or staff for further but unnecessary study to avoid a decision is a staff ploy known as "log-rolling;" it is a subterfuge for electing to do nothing. If doing nothing is our alternative of choice, then we should identify it as such. We overtly *decide* whether the time is right to make this decision now and whether to advance or halt decision making.

RESOURCES

We also need to check the validity of the resource assumptions that we incorporated into the analysis. The availability of resources of all sorts may change quickly and drastically while we are making our decision. There may also be more subtle resource issues to consider. For example, although the overall level of resources may not have changed, has the phasing of those resources been altered? Might we have less than we thought during one period of implementation and more than we thought during another? Even though we may have the anticipated resources, is there some additional reason to anticipate a change, perhaps due to some action that another organization might take in response to our decision? In recent history, DoD has been reluctantly forced to shift procurement funds into Operations and Maintenance accounts to sustain current operations; hence the lament, "procurement is the bill payer."

STRATEGY

Finally, we must keep in mind that the executive decision maker has a perspective on the problem that is broader and more informed than that of any of the analysts. That perspective is precisely what distinguishes the executive level. In addition to the other factors considered above, that broad perspective must include an understanding of the overall strategic direction that the senior defense leadership desires. An analytically optimal solution for a short-term, narrow problem may conflict with the broader, longer-term intentions of senior leaders. Staff officers may not have this information, and, therefore, the alternatives they produce may not take it into account. That comparison of the alternative to the organization's long-term goals is the executive decision maker's responsibility.

Decision Situations

Factoring in the problems of omissions, timing, spillover effects, resources, and strategy usually complicates choosing among alternatives. A cost-effectiveness analysis may produce a clear preference for one alternative over its competitors; however when we introduce organizational considerations, we may change the preference. Unfortunately, organizational factors can make it difficult to know which alternative is likely to lead to the best outcome because the definition of "best" becomes complicated. This is most likely when there are several alternatives that are roughly equal in terms of cost and effectiveness but have varied organizational implications. One alternative may be a better fit with deadlines as aging equipment is phased out. Another al-

ternative may offer a superior fit with existing logistics pipelines while another minimizes changes to training programs. Yet another may be preferred from the standpoint of forthcoming doctrinal changes. The question is how to choose among such alternatives.

One approach is to perform a second analysis based on organizational criteria. For example, we could use a weighted model approach. A problem with this type of model is the time and difficulty to gain consensus on the weights from the collection of participating groups, each with their differing perspectives. At the very least, however, we can seek to clarify the results of selecting each alternative, even if we cannot agree on the relative importance of each outcome. Agreement on cause and effect (alternative and outcome) between organizations should be the foundation for reaching a decision about the best alternative. Below, we discuss two techniques designed for this purpose: decision mapping and decision trees. They will help us see where the commonality and differences in value of outcomes lie among our organizations.

DECISION MAPPING

Decision mapping allows us to depict the cause-and-effect linkage between an alternative (**A**) and its outcome (**O**) for each issue associated with our decision. The issues we examine may parallel our criteria and must be related to the analytic objective (and therefore the decision objective). Each alternative must generate an outcome, however some of the outcomes may be identical, e.g., where performance differences are marginal among the alternatives, we may equate the outcomes. When we look at multiple issues, the alternatives will produce different combinations of outcomes and the map becomes more complicated.

The simplest choice to map is when we have a single issue and a one-to-one correspondence between two alternatives (**A1** and **A2**) and two different outcomes (**O1** and **O2**). For example, with the arrow read as "yields" or "leads to," if:

A1 ⇒ **O1** and

A2 ⇒ **O2** and we prefer **O2** to **O1**, we should select **Alternative 2**.

As long as we have a clear preference ordering for the outcomes for this issue, the situation remains simple even if we add additional alternatives. For example, if:

A3 ⇒ **O3** and we prefer **Outcome 3** to **O2** and **O1**, then we should select **Alternative 3**.

Suppose, however, we find that we prefer **Outcome 3** to **Outcome 2** and that we prefer **Outcome 2** to **Outcome 1**, but that we prefer **Outcome 1** to **Outcome 3**. Our preferences are inconsistent. It is impossible to choose a course of action based purely on the merits of each alternative and its outcome. Within our own organization, we are less likely to face these kinds of choices, but when we deal with other organizations during the Reconciliation Phase, this circumstance becomes more likely, i.e., these organizations each have different preferred outcomes.

Another complication arises when we have alternatives that we have to evaluate for several issues and therefore each alternative has multiple outcomes. If the same alternative achieves the most preferable outcome for each issue, then it is clearly our choice. However, when they rank order differently, identifying the optimal alternative is less clear. A decision map for three issues and two alternatives looks like this:

	<u>ISSUES</u>		
	I	II	III
A1 ⇒	O1-1	O2-1	O3-1
A2 ⇒	O1-2	O2-2	O3-2

where **OI-1** is **A**lternative 1's **O**utcome for Issue I, **OI-2** is **A**lternative 2's **O**utcome for Issue I, etc. Now, because of the multiple issues, we may have a mixture of preferences between the alternatives as we analyze each issue. Our choice is not clear unless we can agree on the relative importance of the issues. Are they roughly equal so that the alternative that does better in any two issues is automatically preferred? Or, rather, does one issue dominate to the extent that the alternative that fares best in that area becomes our choice? Again, different organizations may value the importance of each issue differently, but we should be able to agree on the relative merits of each alternative's outcomes compared to the others' for each issue.

Consider an example in aircraft procurement when we compare three alternatives based upon various kinds of cost (usually near-term and life cycle costs), schedule (initial operational capability), and performance. We can display our preferences for outcomes in a decision map using the same notation as before. Cost, schedule, and performance are our three issues (and in this case are criteria), I through III. Each alternative aircraft has a different outcome (or value) for each issue and we show our preference for each outcome below:

	<u>ISSUES</u>		
	I (Cost)	II (Schedule)	III (Performance)
A1	OI-1	OII-1	OIII-1
A2	OI-2	OII-2	OIII-2
A3	OI-3	OII-3	OIII-3

As we look at each issue, we will rank order our preference for the alternatives as best, median, and worst and replace our symbols. Rebuilding the map:

	Issue		
Alternative	Cost	Schedule	Performance
A1	Best	Median	Median
A2	Worst	Worst	Worst
A3	Median	Best	Best

Table 10-1. Decision Map.

Although we cannot make a quick choice between **A1** and **A3**, we can eliminate **A2**. It scores poorly for every issue. Our analysis and mapping did not provide an unambiguous answer, but it did structure the decision and allow us to winnow the alternatives. We can now focus the discussion upon the relative importance of Issue I (Cost) compared to the combined value of Issues II (Schedule) and III (Performance) and apply our military judgment to make a decision.

Let us expand this example to make it more specific. As above, suppose we are reviewing the analysis to support a decision to choose an alternative for a tactical aircraft, an air superiority fighter. We have decided there are four principal organizational issues or criteria: Near-Term Cost, Total Ownership Cost, Date of Initial Operational Capability, and Tactical Performance. We have identified three alternatives: **A1**, an upgraded fighter; **A2**, a new fighter currently in advanced flight testing; and, **A3**, a new fighter under concept development.

Alternative 1 can be fielded soonest but it is the most expensive in the near-term. Alternative 2 has the best tactical performance but it has the highest total ownership cost. Alternative 3 has

the lowest near term and total ownership costs, but it will take the longest to field and has the poorest tactical performance. The decision map looks like this:

Alternative	Near-Term Cost	Issue		
		Total Ownership Cost	Initial Operational Capability	Tactical Performance
Upgrade	Worst	Median	Best	Median
Prototype	Median	Worst	Median	Best
New design t	Best	Best	Worst	Worst

Table 10-2. Decision Map for Aircraft Alternatives.

Part of your organization prefers Alternative 2 (the prototype) because it believes that the superior performance of the aircraft will convince DoD's leadership and Congress it is worth a higher total ownership cost. Another part of your organization prefers Alternative 1 (the upgrade) believing that, despite the immediate up front cost, it is crucial to field an improved aircraft against the threat as soon as possible. Another organization, whose cooperation we need, favors Alternative 3 (the new design). They feel strongly that conserving financial resources in the short term should dominate this decision now because countering the foreseeable threat does not demand a large leap forward in capability. The three stakeholders do not share the same preferences for second choices either.

How do we make a choice in such circumstances? The first step is to see whether, although we have no consensus on a first choice, we have agreement on a last choice. In the same vein, we may seek to clarify the situation further and produce a more internally consistent set of preferences. This requires that we be thoroughly grounded in our organization's interests (see Chapter 11, Reconciliation). For example, if we bring the stakeholders together to probe their views jointly, they may converge on a choice or reject one of the alternatives. Another approach is to make a decision based purely on what we can implement least painfully. That may not be the optimal choice for anyone, but the process moves forward.

Rather than selecting the best alternative, we may choose to satisfice, settling on an alternative that solves the problem, an alternative that is *satisfactory* and *suffices*, without an exhaustive search for an optimal solution. Satisficing is rational behavior when the differences between an adequate solution and the optimal solution are small and difficult to detect. It is also rational if the decision maker is constrained by time or if his top priority is to “keep peace in the family.”

Yet another approach might be to make our choice among alternatives based exclusively on our organization's preferences and let the reconciliation process work out the differences in preferences with the other stakeholders.

DECISION TREES

We have a graphic technique, Decision Trees, that is useful for displaying chains of outcomes as they relate to a decision or analytic objective. They are particularly helpful for decisions with many spillover effects. We use decision trees in military operational planning to show the branches and sequels from our courses of action. We use them in force planning decisions, especially with policy choices, to display a series of outcomes conditioned by preceding choices. Often, as we cope with risk and uncertainty, we label them with expected values.

The decision tree begins with an initial decision point that branches into alternative paths called branches. At the end of each branch is another node (decision point) that may generate another set of branches. A sequence of branches ends when the paths reach a set of final outcomes in terms of the analytic or decision objective; the number of branches depends on the decision process we structure along the way. Immediately before the outcomes, the alternatives must be mutually exclusive.

Decision trees are especially effective when we use them to represent an incremental process. Figure 10-1 shows the components of a hypothetical decision tree for sexual harassment policy. The decision objective is to build a policy to reduce the occurrence of sexual harassment in a command. The first set of branches shows the major approaches the command may take to combat sexual harassment: reprimand bad behavior (Punishment - **A1**), prevent inappropriate behavior (Education - **A2**), and adjust the organizational climate (Working Environment - **A3**).

In this case, there are more decisions we must make about each alternative before we can establish a working policy.

To expand branch **A1**, we decide how we will discipline personnel who violate our policy; our vague intention to punish them is not enough. The choices about our baseline policy that follow are of decreasing severity and are mutually exclusive:

A11: Discharge all offenders immediately

A12: Reprimand first offenders; discharge thereafter

A13: Warn first offenders; reprimand second offenders; discharge thereafter

After we identify the alternatives, we assess the outcomes associated with each. Here we capture spillover effects as well as the outcomes related directly to the analytic or decision objective.




Figure 10-1. A Decision Tree for Combating Sexual Harassment.

For the alternatives above, where <SH means we project decreases in sexual harassment incidents and <<SH and <<<SH mean increasingly larger decreases:

○11:<<<SH, loss of many trained personnel

○12:<<SH, some trained personnel lost

○13:<SH, almost no trained personnel lost

We can follow a similar process through branches **A2** and **A3**.

Several aspects of the decision tree in figure 10-1 help us frame this decision and decide upon a policy. First, at the end of each secondary node we have mutually exclusive, actionable alternatives from which to choose. Second, the spillover effects of each choice are also clear, e.g., the penalty for drastically reducing incidences of sexual harassment (○11) by implementing **A11** is a higher attrition of skilled personnel. These personnel will be costly to replace, both locally (gapped billets from unplanned losses) and for the service (recruiting and training). Note, too, that although not shown as branches on this particular tree, doing nothing is also an option for each issue: we could leave current punishment and education practice in place or decline to change the number of gender-integrated units.

Decision trees do not need to be symmetric; the number of nodes along paths in the same tree may vary and there may be any number (greater than one) of branches from a decision point. Every end branch—the actionable alternative—must result in an outcome that is acceptable in some way to the decision maker. If it is not, then the alternative leading the outcome is not valid; in this case, we need alternatives that lead to a decrease in sexual harassment. We can enhance decision trees by labeling the probability of an outcome or its expected value along the branches. Another strength of the decision tree is the way it highlights opportunities for combining alternatives. For example, if we are going to remove perpetrators with the first offense (**A11**), then we need to select **A21** as well or the policy will not have any deterrent value and we will suffer higher than necessary personnel attrition. If we also select **A31**, we will want to postpone its implementation until we do the comprehensive preventative training or we may create more incidents and discharge more personnel than is necessary.

Reality Check

After we select an alternative from our personal and then our organization's perspective, we must take one more look at our decision using professional judgment and intuition. We have all had the experience of solving a complex math problem and arriving at an answer that, by brief inspection alone, just seems wrong. We need to put our analysis-based decisions to exactly the same test. We may have striven so hard to overcome anticipated opposition that we have lost sight of the best alternative. We may have looked at the material so long that an important issue has escaped our notice. We should revisit our expectations for the Reconciliation Phase to see if the alternative can survive politically, e.g., the Army National Guard is so politically powerful it has forestalled any serious combat force structure reductions.

Presentation of Results

We should document our decisions. Our decision presentations can range from informal conversations and memos to academic thought pieces published in professional journals. Documentation preserves *our* thoughts for easy reference, for our successors, and ourselves that may

be helpful as our organization prepares for reconciliation. We can use reports and studies to record analysis-intensive efforts like procurement decisions or force structure proposals and we often distribute our results widely to other organizations. We can write issue papers for the internal consumption of our headquarters or staff. Issue papers document program evaluations and record our thoughts about the proposals of others; we use them extensively to prepare senior leaders for meetings and testimony. Policy option papers are the culmination of policy recommendations and at their conclusion we often ask a decision maker to select an alternative. Any of these formats may be the basis for decision briefings for senior leaders or information briefings for other organizations. Regardless of form, our Executive Decision-Making Framework provides a good outline for crafting any of these reports.

Preparing for Reconciliation

Our framework helps us make a rational choice for our organization, or at least to ask the right questions at each step in the analysis of our choice. We probably have known from the beginning that *our* choice is unlikely to be *the* choice that our command implements without the approval of other decision makers from organizations both parallel and senior to our own. We have deliberately framed the decision in terms of our organization and our internal influences to simplify the problem. As we move toward reconciliation with other groups and address external influences, the values and norms of these new participants, as they apply to the alternatives, will be very important to us.

The reconciliation of our decision with the interests of others involves advocacy and negotiation (which we discuss in the next chapter). Before we negotiate, we must be firmly grounded in our interests, our priorities, and our preferred option. We have done this by using a systematic decision process that involved the senior leaders at each important juncture. We must be prepared to accept the burden of proof if we are going to advocate a change in existing force planning options or policy; our analysis must support the change. Our advocacy must be rational itself, based on values consistent with our organization and logically supported by facts.

Summary

In this chapter, we have discussed the procedures for selecting alternatives within our organization. We began by reviewing the earlier Definition and Analysis Phases to see if anything important had changed or been omitted. We evaluated spillover effects and decided whether now is the time to decide this issue. To frame the decision and focus discussion, we examined the display techniques of mapping and decision trees. After selecting our personally preferred option, we did a reality check, and forwarded our choice to the decision maker. We documented our decision and now we are looking ahead to the Reconciliation Phase.

